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ABSTRACT
Recommender system is an essential component of web services
to engage users. Popular recommender systems model user prefer-
ences and item properties using a large amount of crowdsourced
user-item interaction data, e.g., rating scores; then top-N items
that match the best with a user’s preference are recommended to
the user. In this work, we show that an attacker can launch a data
poisoning attack to a recommender system to make recommenda-
tions as the attacker desires via injecting fake users with carefully
crafted user-item interaction data. Specifically, an attacker can trick
a recommender system to recommend a target item to as many
normal users as possible. We focus on matrix factorization based
recommender systems because they have been widely deployed in
industry. Given the number of fake users the attacker can inject,
we formulate the crafting of rating scores for the fake users as an
optimization problem. However, this optimization problem is chal-
lenging to solve as it is a non-convex integer programming problem.
To address the challenge, we develop several techniques to approx-
imately solve the optimization problem. For instance, we leverage
influence function to select a subset of normal users who are influen-
tial to the recommendations and solve our formulated optimization
problem based on these influential users. Our results show that our
attacks are effective and outperform existing methods.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Web application security.
KEYWORDS
Adversarial recommender systems, data poisoning attacks, ad-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recommender system is a key component of many web services to
help users locate items they are interested in. Many recommender
systems are based on collaborative filtering. For instance, given
a large amount of user-item interaction data (we consider rating
scores in this work) provided by users, a recommender system
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learns to model latent users’ preferences and items’ features, and
then the system recommends top-N items to each user, where the
features of the top-N items best match with the user’s preference.
As a recommender system is driven by user-item interaction data,
an attacker can manipulate a recommender system via injecting
fake users with fake user-item interaction data to the system. Such
attacks are known as data poisoning attacks [9, 10, 17, 19, 23, 35, 39].
Several recent studies designed recommender-system-specific data
poisoning attacks to association-rule-based [39], graph-based [10]
and matrix-factorization-based recommender systems [19]. How-
ever, how to design customized attacks to matrix-factorization-
based top-N recommender systems remains an open question even
though such recommender systems have been widely deployed in
the industry. In this work, we aim to bridge the gap. In particular,
we aim to design an optimized data poisoning attack to matrix-
factorization-based top-N recommender systems. Suppose that an
attacker can injectm fake users into the recommender system and
each fake user can rate at most n items, which we call filler items.
Then, the key question is: how to select the filler items and assign
rating scores to them such that an attacker-chosen target item is
recommended to as many normal users as possible? To answer this
question, we formulate an optimization problem for selecting filler
items and assigning rating scores for the fake users, with an objec-
tive to maximize the number of normal users to whom the target
item is recommended.
However, it is challenging to solve this optimization problem be-
cause it is a non-convex integer programming problem. To address
the challenge, we propose a series of techniques to approximately
solve the optimization problem. First, we propose to use a loss
function to approximate the number of normal users to whom the
target item is recommended. We relax the integer rating scores to
continuous variables and convert them back to integer rating scores
after solving the reformulated optimization problem. Second, to
enhance the effectiveness of our attack, we leverage the influence
function approach inspired by the interpretable machine learning
literature [14, 15, 34] to account for the reality that the top-N rec-
ommendations may be only affected by a subset S of influential
users. For convenience, throughout the rest of this paper, we refer to
our attack as S-attack. We show that the influential user selection
subproblem enjoys the submodular property, which guarantees a
(1 − 1/e) approximation ratio with a simple greedy selection algo-
rithm. Lastly, given S, we develop a gradient-based optimization
algorithm to determine rating scores for the fake users.
We evaluate our S-attack and compare it with multiple baseline
attacks on two benchmark datasets, including Yelp and Amazon
Digital Music (Music). Our results show that our attacks can ef-
fectively promote a target item. For instance, on the Yelp dataset,
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when injecting only 0.5% of fake users, our attack can make a ran-
domly selected target item appear in the top-N recommendation
lists of 150 times more normal users. Our S-attack outperforms the
baseline attacks and continues to be effective even if the attacker
does not know the parameters of the target recommender system.
We also investigate the effects of our attacks on recommender sys-
tems that are equipped with fake users detection capabilities. For
this purpose, we train a binary classifier to distinguish between
fake users and normal ones. Our results show that this classifier is
effective against traditional attack schemes, e.g., PGA attack [19],
etc. Remarkably, we find that our influence-function-based attack
continues to be effective. The reason is that our proposed attack is
designed with stealth in mind, and the detection method can detect
some fake users but miss a large fraction of them.
Finally, we show that our influence function based approach
can also be used to enhance data poisoning attacks to graph-based
top-N recommender systems. Moreover, we show that instead of
using influence function to select a subset of influential users, using
influence function to weight each normal user can further improve
the effectiveness of data poisoning attacks, though such approach
sacrifices computational efficiency.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• Wepropose the first data poisoning attack tomatrix-factorization-
based Top-N recommender systems, which we formulate as a
non-convex integer optimization problem.
• We propose a series of techniques to approximately solve the
optimization problem with provable performance guarantee.
• We evaluate our S-attack and compare it with state-of-the-art
using two benchmark datasets. Our results show that our attack
is effective and outperforms existing ones.
2 RELATEDWORK
Data poisoning attacks to recommender systems: The secu-
rity and privacy issues in machine learning models have been stud-
ied in many scenarios [24, 30–32, 40, 42, 43]. The importance of
data poisoning attacks has also been recognized in recommender
systems [7, 21–23, 29, 38]. Earlier work on poisoning attacks against
recommender systems are mostly agnostic to recommender systems
and do not achieve satisfactory attack performance, e.g., random
attack [17] and average attack [17]. Recently, there is a line of
work focusing on attacking specific types of recommender systems
[10, 19, 39]. For example, Fang et al. [10] proposed efficient poison-
ing attacks to graph-based recommender systems. They injected
fake users with carefully crafted rating scores to the recommender
systems in order to promote a target item. They modeled the at-
tack as an optimization problem to decide the rating scores for
the fake users. Li et al. [19] proposed poisoning attacks to matrix-
factorization-based recommender systems. Instead of attacking
the top-N recommendation lists, their goal was to manipulate the
predictions for all missing entries of the rating matrix. As a re-
sult, the effectiveness of their attacks is unsatisfactory in matrix-
factorization-based top-N recommender systems.
Data poisoning attacks to other systems: Data poisoning at-
tacks generally refer to attacks that manipulate the training data
of a machine learning or data mining system such that the learnt
model makes predictions as an attacker desires. Other than recom-
mender systems, data poisoning attacks were also studied for other
systems. For instance, existing studies have demonstrated effective
data poisoning attacks can be launched to anomaly detectors [28],
spam filters [25], SVMs [4, 37], regression methods [12, 36], graph-
based methods [33, 44], neural networks [5, 11, 20], and federated
learning [9], which significantly affect their performance.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
3.1 Matrix-Factorization-Based Recommender
Systems: A Primer
A matrix-factorization-based recommender system [16] maps users
and items into latent factor vectors. Let U, I and E denote the
user, item and rating sets, respectively. We also let |U|, |I | and
|E | denote the numbers of users, items and ratings, respectively.
Let R ∈ R |U |×|I | represent the user-item rating matrix, where
each entry rui denotes the score that user u rates the item i . Let
xu ∈ Rd and yi ∈ Rd denote the latent factor vector for user u and
item i , respectively, where d is the dimension of latent factor vector.
For convenience, we use matrices X = [x1, . . . ,x |U |] and Y =
[y1, . . . ,y |I |] to group all x- andy-vectors. In matrix-factorization-
based recommender systems, we aim to learn X and Y via solving
the following optimization problem:
argmin
X ,Y
∑
(u,i)∈E
(
rui − x⊤u yi
)2
+ λ
(∑
u
∥xu ∥22 +
∑
i
∥yi ∥22
)
, (1)
where ∥·∥2 is the ℓ2 norm and λ is the regularization parameter.
Then, the rating score that a user u gives to an unseen item i is
predicted as rˆui = x⊤u yi , where x⊤u denotes the transpose of vector
xu . Lastly, the N unseen items with the highest predicted rating
scores are recommended to each user.
3.2 Threat Model
Given a target item t , the goal of the attacker is to promote item
t to as many normal users as possible and maximize the hit ratio
h(t), which is defined as the fraction of normal users whose top-N
recommendation lists include the target item t . We assume that the
attacker is able to inject some fake users into the recommender sys-
tem, each fake user will rate the target item t with high rating score
and give carefully crafted rating scores to other well-selected items.
The attacker may have full knowledge of the target recommender
system (e.g., all the rating data, the recommendation algorithm).
The attacker may also only have partial knowledge of the target
recommender system, e.g., the attacker only has access to some
ratings. We will show that our attacks are still effective when the
attacker has partial knowledge of the target recommender system.
3.3 Attack Strategy
We assume that the rating scores of the target recommender system
are integer-valued and can only be selected from the set {0, 1, · · · ,
rmax }, where rmax is the maximum rating score. We assume that
the attacker can injectm fake users into the recommender system.
We denote byM the set ofm fake users. Each fake user will rate
the target item t and at most n other carefully selected items (called
filler items). We consider each fake user rates at most n filler items
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to avoid being easily detected. We let rv and Ωv denote the rating
score vector of fake user v and the set of items rated by v , respec-
tively, where v ∈ M and |Ωv | ≤ n + 1. Then, rvi is the score that
user v rates the item i , i ∈ Ωv . Clearly, Ωv satisfies |Ωv | = ∥rv ∥0,
where ∥·∥0 is the ℓ0 norm (i.e., the number of non-zero entries in a
vector). The attacker’s goal is to find an optimal rating score vector
for each fake user v to maximize the hit ratio h(t). We formulate
this hit ratio maximization problem (HRM) as follows:
HRM: max h(t) (2)
s.t. |Ωv | ≤ n + 1, ∀v ∈ M, (3)
rvi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , rmax }, ∀v ∈ M,∀i ∈ Ωv . (4)
Problem HRM is an integer programming problem and is NP-hard
in general. Thus, finding an optimal solution is challenging. In the
next section, we will propose techniques to approximately solve
the problem.
4 OUR SOLUTION
We optimize the rating scores for fake users one by one instead of
optimizing for all them fake users simultaneously. In particular, we
repeatedly optimize the rating scores of one fake user and add the
fake user to the recommender system until we havem fake users.
However, it is still challenging to solve the HRM problem even if
we consider only one fake user. To address the challenge, we design
several techniques to approximately solve the HRM problem for
one fake user. First, we relax the discrete ratings to continuous data
and convert them back to discrete ratings after solving the problem.
Second, we use a differentiable loss function to approximate the
hit ratio. Third, instead of using all normal users, we use a selected
subset of influential users to solve the HRM problem, which makes
our attack more effective. Fourth, we develop a gradient-based
method to solve the HRM problem to determine the rating scores
for the fake user.
4.1 Relaxing Rating Scores
We let vector wv = [wvi , i ∈ Ωv ]⊤ be the relaxed continuous
rating score vector of fake userv , wherewvi is the rating score that
user v gives to the item i . Since rvi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , rmax } is discrete,
which makes it difficult to solve the optimization problem defined
in (2), we relax the discrete rating score rvi to continuous variables
wvi that satisfywvi ∈ [0, rmax ]. Then, we can use gradient-based
methods to computewv . After we solve the optimization problem,
we convert each wvi back to a discrete integer value in the set
{0, 1, · · · , rmax }.
4.2 Approximating the Hit Ratio
We let Γu be the set of top-N recommended items for a user u, i.e.,
Γu consists of the N items that u has not rated before and have the
largest predicted rating scores. To approximate the optimization
problem defined in (2), we define a loss function that is subject to
the following rules: 1) for each item i ∈ Γu , if rˆui < rˆut , then the
loss is small, where rˆui and rˆut are the predicted rating scores that
user u gives to item i and target item t , respectively; 2) the higher
target item t ranks in Γu , the smaller the loss. Based on these rules,
we reformulate the HRM problem as the following problem:
min
wv
LU (wv ) =
∑
u ∈U
∑
i ∈Γu
д(rˆui − rˆut ) + η∥wv ∥1
s.t.wvi ∈ [0, rmax ],
(5)
where д(x) = 11+exp(−x/b) is the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney loss
function [2], b is the width parameter, η is the regularization pa-
rameter, and ∥·∥1 is the ℓ1 norm. Note that д(·) guarantees that
LU (wv ) ≥ 0 and is differentiable. The ℓ1 regularizer ∥wv ∥1 aims
to model the constraint that each fake user rates at most n filler
items. In particular, the ℓ1 regularizer makes a fake user’s ratings
small to many items and we can select the n items with the largest
ratings as the filler items.
4.3 Determining the Set of Influential Users
It has been observed in [18, 34] that different training samples have
different contributions to the solution quality of an optimization
problem, and the performance of the model training could be im-
proved if we drop some training samples with low contributions.
Motivated by this observation, instead of optimizing the ratings of
a fake user over all normal users, we solve the problem in (5) using
a subset of influential users, who are the most responsible for the
prediction of the target item before attack. We let S ∈ U represent
the set of influential users for the target item t . For convenience, in
what follows, we refer to our attack asS-attack. Under theS-attack,
we further reformulate (5) as the following problem:
min
wv
LS(wv ) =
∑
u ∈S
∑
i ∈Γu
д(rˆui − rˆut ) + η∥wv ∥1
s.t.wvi ∈ [0, rmax ].
(6)
Next, we propose an influence function approach to determine
S and then solve the optimization problem defined in (6). We let
𭟋(S, t) denote the influence of removing all users in the set S on
the prediction at the target item t , where influence here is defined
as the change of the predicted rating score. We want to find a set of
influential users that have the largest influence on the target item t .
Formally, the influence maximization problem can be defined as:
max 𭟋(S, t), s.t. |S| = ∆, (7)
where ∆ is the desired set size (i.e., the number of users in set S).
However, it can be shown that the problem is NP-hard [13]. In order
to solve the above influence maximization problem of (7), we first
show how to measure the influence of one user, then we show how
to approximately find a set of ∆ users with the maximum influence.
We define π (k, t) as the influence of removing user k on the
prediction at the target item t :
π (k, t) def=
∑
j ∈Ωk φ((k, j), t), (8)
where φ((k, j), t) is the influence of removing edge (k, j) in the user-
item bipartite on the prediction at the target item t , Ωk is the set of
items rated by user k . Then, the influence of removing user set S
on the prediction at the target item t can be defined as:
𭟋(S, t) def=
∑
k ∈S π (k, t). (9)
Since the influence of user and user set can be computed based
on the edge influence φ((k, j), t), the key challenge boils down to
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how to evaluate φ((k, j), t) efficiently. Next, we will propose an
appropriate influence function to efficiently compute φ((k, j), t).
4.3.1 Influence Function forMatrix-factorization-based Recommender
Systems. For a given matrix-factorization-based recommender sys-
tem, we can rewrite (1) as follows:
θ∗ = argmin
θ
1
|E |
∑
(u,i)∈E
ℓ((u, i),θ ), (10)
where θ≜ (X ,Y ). We let rˆui (θ ) denote the predicted rating score
user u gives to item i under parameter θ , and rˆui (θ ) ≜ x⊤u (θ )yi (θ ).
If we increase the weight of the edge (k, j) ∈ E by some ζ , then
the perturbed optimal parameter θ∗ζ ,(k, j) can be written as:
θ∗ζ ,(k, j) = argmin
θ
1
|E |
∑
(u,i)∈E
ℓ((u, i),θ ) + ζ ℓ((k, j),θ ). (11)
Since removing the edge (k, j) is equivalent to increasing its
weight by ζ = − 1|E | , the influence of removing edge (k, j) on the
prediction at edge (o, t) can be approximated as follows [8, 15]:
Φ((k, j), (o, t))def= rˆot
(
θ∗ε\(k, j)
)
− rˆot (θ∗)≈− 1|E | ·
∂rˆot
(
θ∗ζ ,(k, j)
)
∂ζ

ζ =0
=
1
|E | ∇θ rˆ
⊤
ot (θ∗)H−1θ ∗ ∇θ ℓ((k, j),θ∗), (12)
where θ∗ε\(k, j) is the optimal model parameter after removing edge
(k, j) and Hθ ∗ represents the Hessian matrix of the objective func-
tion defined in (10). Therefore, the influence of removing edge (k, j)
on the prediction at the target item t can be computed as:
φ((k, j), t) def=
∑
o∈U |Φ((k, j), (o, t))| , (13)
where |·| is the absolute value.
4.3.2 Approximation Algorithm for Determining S. Due to the com-
binatorial complexity, solving the optimization problem defined in
(7) remains an NP-hard problem. Fortunately, based on the observa-
tion that the influence of set S (e.g.,𭟋(S, t)) exhibits a diminishing
returns property, we propose a greedy selection algorithm to find a
solution to (7) with an approximation ratio guarantee. The approxi-
mation algorithm is a direct consequence of the following result,
which says that the influence 𭟋(S, t) is monotone and submodular.
Theorem 1 (Submodularity). The influence 𭟋(S, t) is normal-
ized, monotonically non-decreasing and submodular.
Proof. Define three sets A, B and C, where A ⊆ B and C =
B \ A. To simplify the notation, we use 𭟋(A) to denote 𭟋(A, t).
It is clear that the influence function is normalized since 𭟋(∅) = 0.
When there is no ambiguity, we let 𭟋(u) denote 𭟋({u}) for u ∈ U.
Since𭟋(B)−𭟋(A) = ∑
u ∈B
𭟋(u)− ∑
u ∈A
𭟋(u) = ∑
u ∈B\A
𭟋(u) = 𭟋(C) ≥
0, which implies that the influence 𭟋(S, t) is monotonically non-
decreasing. To show the submodular property, we let S denote the
complement of a set S. Now, consider an arbitrary setD, for which
we have: 𭟋(B ∪ D) − 𭟋(A ∪ D) = 𭟋((B ∪ D) \ (A ∪ D)) (a)=
𭟋(C \ (C ∩ D)) ≤ 𭟋(C) = 𭟋(B) −𭟋(A), where (a) follows from
(B ∪D) \ (A ∪D) = (B ∪D)∩ (A ∪ D) = (B ∪D)∩ (A ∩D) =
Algorithm 1 Greedy Influential User Selection.
Input: Rating matrix R, budget ∆.
Output: Influential user set S.
1: Initialize S = ∅.
2: while |S| < ∆ do
3: Select u = argmaxk ∈U\Sπ (k, t).
4: S ← S ∪ {u}.
5: end while
6: return S.
(B ∩A ∩D) ∪ (D ∩A ∩D) = C ∩D = C \ (C ∩D). Hence, the
influence 𭟋(S, t) is submodular and the proof is completed. □
Based on the submodular property of 𭟋(S, t), we propose Algo-
rithm 1, a greedy-based selection method to select an influential
user set S with ∆ users. More specifically, we first compute the
influence of each user, and add the user with the largest influence
to the candidate set S (breaking ties randomly). Then, we recom-
pute the influence of the remaining users in the set U \ S, and
find the user with the largest influence within the remaining users,
so on and so forth. We repeat this process until we find ∆ users.
Clearly, the running time of Algorithm 1 is linear. The following
result states that Algorithm 1 achieves a (1 − 1/e) approximation
ratio, and its proof follows immediately from standard results in
submodular optimization [26] and is omitted here for brevity.
Theorem 2. Let S be the influential user set returned by Algo-
rithm 1 and let S∗ be the optimal influential user set, respectively. It
then holds that 𭟋(S, t) ≥
(
1 − 1e
)
𭟋(S∗, t).
4.4 Solving Rating Scores for a Fake User
Given S, we design a gradient-based method to solve the problem
in (6). Recall that we letwv = [wvi , i ∈ Ωv ]⊤ be the rating vector
for the current injected fake user v . We first determine his/her
latent factors by solving Eq. (1), which can be restated as:
argmin
X ,Y ,z
∑
(u,i)∈E′
(
rui − x⊤u yi
)2
+
∑
i ∈I
(
wvi − z⊤yi
)2
+λ
(∑
u
∥xu ∥22 +
∑
i
∥yi ∥22 + ∥z∥22
)
, (14)
where z ∈ Rd is the latent factor vector for fake user v , and E ′
is the current rating set (rating set E without attack plus injected
ratings of fake users added before user v).
Toward this end, note that a subgradient of loss LS(wv ) in (6)
can be computed as:
G(wv ) =
∑
u ∈S
∑
i ∈Γu
∇wvд(rˆui − rˆut ) + η∂ ∥wv ∥1
=
∑
u ∈S
∑
i ∈Γu
∂д
(
δu,it
)
∂δu,it
(∇wv rˆui − ∇wv rˆut ) + η∂ ∥wv ∥1, (15)
where δu,it = rˆui − rˆut and ∂д(δu,it )∂δu,it =
д(δu,it )(1−д(δu,it ))
b . The
subgradient ∂ ∥wv ∥1 can be computed as ∂∂wv i ∥wv ∥1 =
wv i
|wv i | . To
compute ∇wv rˆui , noting that rˆui = x⊤u yi , then the gradient ∂rˆui∂wv
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Algorithm 2 Our S-Attack.
Input: Rating matrix R, target item t , parametersm,n,d,η, λ,∆,b.
Output: Fake user setM.
1: Find influential user set S according to Algorithm 1 for item t .
2: LetM = ∅.
3: for v = 1, · · · ,m do
4: Solve the optimization problem defined in Eq. (6) to getwv .
5: Select n items with the largest values ofwvi as filler items.
6: Set rvt = rmax .
7: Let µi and σ 2i be item i’s mean and variance of the scores
rated by all normal users. Let rvi ∼ N(µi , σ 2i ) be the random
rating for each filler item i given by fake user v .
8: Let R ← R ∪ {rv } andM ←M ∪ {v}.
9: end for
10: return {rv }mv=1 andM.
can be computed as:
∂rˆui
∂wv
= Jwv (xu )⊤yi + Jwv (yi )⊤xu , (16)
where Jwv (xu ) and Jwv (yi ) are the Jacobian matrices of xu and
yi taken with respect towv , respectively. Next, we leverage first-
order stationary condition to approximately compute Jwv (xu ) and
Jwv (yi ). Note that the optimal solution of problem in (14) satisfies
the following first-order stationary condition:
λxu =
∑
i ∈Ωu (rui − x
⊤
u yi )yi , (17)
λyi =
∑
u ∈Ωi (rui − x
⊤
u yi )xu + (wvi − z⊤yi )z, (18)
λz =
∑
i ∈I (wvi − z
⊤yi )yi , (19)
where Ωu is the set of items rated by user u and Ωi is the set of
users who rate the item i . Inspired by [19, 36], we assume that
the optimality conditions given by (17)–(19) remain valid under an
infinitesimal change ofwv . Thus, setting the derivatives of (17)–(19)
with respect towv to zero and with some algebraic computations,
we can derive that:
∂xu
∂wvi
= 0, (20)
∂yi
∂wvi
=
(
λI +
∑
u ∈Ωi xux
⊤
u + zz
⊤)−1z, (21)
where I is the identity matrix and (21) follows from (x⊤u yi )xu =
(xux⊤u )yi . Lastly, computing (20) and (21) for all i ∈ Γu yields
Jwv (xu ) and Jwv (yi ). Note that ∇wv rˆut can be computed in exactly
the same procedure. Finally, after obtaining G(wv ), we can use the
projected subgradient method [3] to solvewv for fake user v . With
wv , we select the top n items with largest values ofwvi as the filler
items. However, the values ofwv obtained from solving (6) may not
mimic the rating behaviors of normal users. To make our S-attack
more “stealthy,” we will show how to generate rating scores to
disguise fake user v . We first set rvt = rmax to promote the target
item t . Then, we generate rating scores for the filler items by rating
each filler item with a normal distribution around the mean rating
for this item by legitimate users, where N(µi , σ 2i ) is the normal
distribution with mean µi and variance σ 2i of item i . Our S-attack
algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Table 1: HR@10 for different attacks.
Dataset Attack
Attack size
0.3% 0.5% 1% 3% 5%
Music
None 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
PGA [19] 0.0107 0.0945 0.1803 0.3681 0.5702
SGLD [19] 0.0138 0.1021 0.1985 0.3587 0.5731
U-TNA 0.0498 0.1355 0.2492 0.4015 0.5832
S-TNA-Rand 0.0141 0.0942 0.2054 0.3511 0.5653
S-TNA-Inf 0.0543 0.1521 0.2567 0.4172 0.6021
Yelp
None 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
PGA [19] 0.0224 0.1623 0.4162 0.4924 0.6442
SGLD [19] 0.0261 0.1757 0.4101 0.5131 0.6431
U-TNA 0.0619 0.2304 0.4323 0.5316 0.6806
S-TNA-Rand 0.0258 0.1647 0.4173 0.4923 0.6532
S-TNA-Inf 0.0643 0.2262 0.4415 0.5429 0.6813
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Experimental Setup
5.1.1 Datasets. We evaluate our attack on two real-world datasets.
The first dataset isAmazonDigitalMusic (Music) [1]. This dataset
consists of 88,639 ratings on 15,442 music by 8,844 users. The sec-
ond dataset is Yelp [41], which contains 504,713 ratings of 11,534
users on 25,229 items.
5.1.2 S-Attack Variants. With different ways of choosing the in-
fluential user set S, we compare three variants of our S-attack.
U-Top-N attack (U-TNA): This variant uses all normal users as
the influential user set S, i.e., S = U, then solve Problem (6).
S-Top-N attack+Random (S-TNA-Rand):This variant randomly
selects ∆ users as the influential user set S, then solve Problem (6).
S-Top-N attack+Influence (S-TNA-Inf): This variant finds the
influential user set S by Algorithm 1, then solve Problem (6).
5.1.3 Baseline Attacks. We compare our S-attack variants with
the following baseline attacks.
Projected gradient ascent attack (PGA) [19]: PGA attack aims
to assign high rating scores to the target items and generates filler
items randomly for the fake users to rate.
Stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics attack (SGLD) [19]:T-
his attack also aims to assign high rating scores to the target items,
but it mimics the rating behavior of normal users. Each fake user
will select n items with the largest absolute ratings as filler items.
5.1.4 Parameter Setting. Unless otherwise stated, we use the fol-
lowing default parameter setting: d = 64, ∆ = 400, η = 0.01,
b = 0.01, and N = 10. Moreover, we set the attack size to be 3% (i.e.,
the number of fake users is 3% of the number of normal users) and
the number of filler items is set to n = 20. We randomly select 10
items as our target items and the hit ratio (HR@N ) is averaged over
the 10 target items, where HR@N of a target item is the fraction of
normal users whose top-N recommendation lists contain the target
item. Note that our S-attack is S-TNA-Inf attack.
5.2 Full-Knowledge Attack
In this section, we consider the worst-case attack scenario, where
the attacker has full knowledge of the recommender system, e.g.,
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Figure 1: The attacker knows a subset of ratings for the nor-
mal users and does not know d .
the type of the target recommender system (matrix-factorization-
based), all rating data, and the parameters of the recommender
system (e.g., the dimension d and the tradeoff parameter λ in use).
Table 1 summaries the results of different attacks. “None” means
the hit ratios without any attacks. First, we observe that the variants
of our S-attack can effectively promote the target items using only
a small number of fake users. For instance, in the Yelp dataset, when
injecting only 0.5% of fake users, S-TNA-Inf attack improves the hit
ratio by 150 times for a random target item compared to that of the
non-attack setting. Second, the variants of our S-attack outperform
the baseline attacks in most cases. This is because the baseline
attacks aim tomanipulate all themissing entries of the ratingmatrix,
while our attack aims to manipulate the top-N recommendation
lists. Third, it is somewhat surprising to see that the S-TNA-Inf
attack outperforms theU-TNA attack. Our observation shows that
by dropping the users that are not influential to the recommendation
of the target items when optimizing the rating scores for the fake
users, we can improve the effectiveness of our attack.
5.3 Partial-Knowledge Attack
In this section, we consider partial-knowledge attack. In particular,
we consider the case where the attacker knows the type of the target
recommender system (matrix-factorization-based), but the attacker
has access to a subset of the ratings for the normal users and does
not know the dimension d . In particular, we view the user-item
rating matrix as a bipartite graph. Given a size of observed data,
we construct the subset of ratings by selecting nodes (users and
items) with increasing distance from the target item (e.g., one-hop
distance to the target item, then two-hop distance and so on) on
the bipartite graph until we reach the size of observed data.
Figure 1 shows the attack results when the attacker observes
different amounts of normal users ratings and our attack uses dif-
ferent d , where the target recommender system uses d = 64. The
attack size is set to be 3%. Note that in the partial-knowledge attack,
the attacker selects the influential user set and generates fake users
based only on the observed data. Naturally, we observe that as the
attacker has access to more ratings of the normal users, the attack
performance improves. We find that our attack also outperforms
SGLD attack (which performs better than PGA attack) in the partial-
knowledge setting. Moreover, our attack is still effective even if the
attacker does not know d . In particular, the curves corresponding
to different d are close to each other for our attack in Figure 1.
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Figure 2: FNR scores for different attacks.
6 DETECTING FAKE USERS
To minimize the impact of potential attacks on recommender sys-
tems, a service provider may arm the recommender systems with
certain fake-user detection capability. In this section, we investigate
whether our attack is still effective in attacking the fake-user-aware
recommender systems. Specifically, we extract six features–namely,
RDMA [6], WDMA [23], WDA [23], TMF [23], FMTD [23], and
MeanVar [23]–for each user from its ratings. Then, for each attack,
we construct a training dataset consisting of 800 fake users gener-
ated by the attack and 800 randomly sampled normal users. We use
the training dataset to learn a SVM classifier. Note that the classifier
may be different for different attacks.
Fake-user detection results:We deploy the trained SVM classi-
fiers to detect the fake users under different attacks settings. Figure 2
reports the fake users detection results of different attacks, where
False Negative Rate (FNR) represents the fraction of fake users that
are predicted to be normal. From Figure 2, we find that PGA attack
is most likely to be detected. The reason is that the fake users gener-
ated by PGA attack do not rate the filler items according to normal
users’ behavior, thus the generated fake users are easily detected.
We also observe that a large fraction of fake users are not detected.
Attacking fake-user-aware recommender systems: We now
test the performance of attacks on fake-user-aware recommender
systems. Suppose that the service provider removes the predicted
fake users from the system detected by the trained SVM classifiers.
We recompute the hit ratio after the service provider excludes the
predicted fake users from the systems. Note that a large portion of
fake users and a small number of normal users will be deleted. The
results are shown in Table 2. We observe that PGA attack achieves
the worst attack performance when the service provider removes
the predicted fake users from the systems. The reason is that the
PGA attack is most likely to be detected. Comparing Table 1 and
Table 2, we can see that when the target recommender system is
equipped with fake-user detectors, our attacks remain effective in
promoting the target items and outperform the baseline attacks.
This is because the detectors miss a large portion of the fake users.
7 DISCUSSION
We show that our influence function based approach can be ex-
tended to enhance data poisoning attacks to graph-based top-N
recommender systems. In particular, we select a subset of normal
users based on influence function and optimize data poisoning at-
tacks using them. Moreover, we show that an attacker can also use
influence function to weight each normal user instead of selecting
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Table 2: HR@10 for different attacks when attacking the
fake-user-aware recommender systems.
Dataset Attack
Attack size
0.3% 0.5% 1% 3% 5%
Music
None 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
PGA [19] 0.0028 0.0043 0.0311 0.2282 0.3243
SGLD [19] 0.0064 0.0145 0.0916 0.2631 0.3516
U-TNA 0.0127 0.0298 0.1282 0.2846 0.3652
S-TNA-Rand 0.0068 0.0139 0.0934 0.2679 0.3531
S-TNA-Inf 0.0199 0.0342 0.1215 0.2994 0.3704
Yelp
None 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
PGA [19] 0.0018 0.0062 0.1143 0.3301 0.4081
SGLD [19] 0.0097 0.0278 0.1585 0.3674 0.4223
U-TNA 0.0231 0.0431 0.1774 0.3951 0.4486
S-TNA-Rand 0.0093 0.0265 0.1612 0.3665 0.4269
S-TNA-Inf 0.0242 0.0474 0.1831 0.3968 0.4501
the most influential ones, which sacrifices computational efficiency
but achieves even better attack effectiveness.
7.1 Influence Function for Graph-based
Recommender Systems
We investigate whether we can extend our influence function based
method to optimize data poisoning attacks to graph-based recom-
mender systems [10]. Specifically, we aim to find a subset of users
who have the largest impact on the target items in graph-based
recommender systems. It turns out that, when optimizing the attack
over these subset of users, we obtain better attack effectiveness. To-
ward this end, we will first show how to find a subset of influential
users for the target items in graph-based recommender systems.
Then, we optimize the attack proposed by [10] over the subset of
influential users.
We consider a graph-based recommender system using random
walks [27]. Specifically, the recommender system models the user-
item ratings as a bipartite graph, where a node is a user or an item,
an edge between a user and an item means that the user rated the
item, and an edge weight is the corresponding rating score. We
let pu represent the stationary distribution of a random walk with
restart that starts from the user u in the bipartite graph. Then, pu
can be computed by solving the following equation:
pu = (1 − α) ·Q · pu + α · eu , (22)
where eu is a basis vector whoseu-th entry is 1 and all other entries
are 0,Q is the transition matrix, and α is the restart probability. We
let qui denote the value at (u, i)-th entry of matrixQ . Then qui can
be computed as:
qui =
{ rui∑
j ruj
, if (u, i) ∈ E,
0, otherwise.
(23)
The N items that were not rated by user u and that have the
largest probabilities in the stationary distribution pu are recom-
mended tou. We define the influence of removing edge (k, j) ∈ E in
the user-item bipartite graph on the target item t when performing
a random walk from user u as the change of prediction at put upon
removing edge (k, j):
δ ((k, j),put ) def= ∂put
∂qk j
, (24)
Table 3: HR@10 for attacks to graph-based recommender
systems.
Dataset Attack
Attack size
0.3% 0.5% 1% 3% 5%
Music
None 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021
Fang et. al [10] 0.0252 0.1021 0.2067 0.2949 0.5224
S-Graph 0.0245 0.1046 0.2125 0.3067 0.5368
Yelp
None 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023
Fang et. al [10] 0.0256 0.1359 0.2663 0.4024 0.5704
S-Graph 0.0342 0.1514 0.2701 0.4011 0.5723
whereqk j is the transitionmatrix entry as defined in (23). According
to (22), ∂pu∂qk j can be computed as:
∂pu
∂qk j
= (1 − α) ∂Q
∂qk j
pu + (1 − α)Q ∂pu
∂qk j
. (25)
After rearranging terms in (25), we have:
∂pu
∂qk j
= (1 − α)(I − (1 − α)Q)−1 ∂Q
∂qk j
pu , (26)
where I is the identity matrix, ∂Q∂qk j is a single-nonzero-entrymatrix
with its (k, j)-th entry being 1 and 0 elsewhere. By letting M ≜
(I − (1 − α)Q)−1, we have the following:
∂pu
∂qk j
= (1 − α)pujM(:,k), (27)
whereM(:,k) is the k-th column of matrixM . Then, the influence
of removing edge (k, j) on the prediction at the target item t when
performing a random walk from user u can be calculated as:
δ ((k, j),put ) = ∂put
∂qk j
= (1 − α)pujM(t ,k). (28)
Therefore, the influence of removing edge (k, j) on the prediction
at the target item t can be computed as:
φ((k, j), t) def=
∑
u ∈U
δ ((k, j),put ). (29)
We could approximate matrixM by using Taylor expansionM =
(I − (1 − α)Q)−1 ≈ I+∑Ti=1 (1 − α)iQi . For example, we can choose
T = 1 if we use first order Taylor approximation.
After obtaining φ((k, j), t), we can compute the influence of user
k at the target item t , namely π (k, t), based on (8). Then, we apply
Algorithm 1 to approximately find an influential user set S. With
the influential user set S, we can optimize the attack proposed by
[10] over the most influential user set and compare with the attack
proposed by [10], which uses all normal users. The poisoning attack
results of graph-based recommender systems are shown in Table 3,
where the experimental settings are the same as those in [10]. Here,
“None” in Table 3 means the hit ratios without attacks computed in
graph-based recommender systems; and “S-Graph” means optimiz-
ing the attack proposed by [10] over the most influential users in
S, where we select 400 influential users. From Table 3, we observe
that the optimized attacks based on influence function outperform
existing ones [10].
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Table 4: HR@10 for weighting-based attacks to matrix-
factorization-based recommender systems.
Dataset Attack
Attack size
0.3% 0.5% 1% 3% 5%
Music Weighting 0.0652 0.1543 0.2436 0.4285 0.6087
Yelp Weighting 0.0698 0.2312 0.4498 0.5501 0.6924
7.2 Weighting Normal Users
In this section, we show that our approach can be extended to
a more general framework: we can weight the normal users in-
stead of dropping some of them using the influence function. More
specifically, we optimize our attack over all normal users, and dif-
ferent normal users are assigned different weights in the objective
function based on their importance with respect to the target item.
Intuitively, the important users should receive more penalty if the
target item does not appear in those users’ recommendation lists.
Toward this end, we letH = [Hu ,u ∈ U]⊤ be the weight vector
for all normal users, then we can modify the loss function defined
in (6) as:
min
wv ,∀v
LU (wv ) =
∑
u ∈U
∑
i ∈Γu
д(rˆui − rˆut ) · Hu + η∥wv ∥1
s.t.
∑
u ∈U
Hu = 1,
wvi ∈ [0, rmax ],
(30)
whereHu is the weight for normal user u and satisfiesHu ≥ 0. We
can again leverage the influence function technique to compute the
weight vectorH. For a normal user k , the weight can be computed
in a normalized fashion as follows:
Hk =
π (k, t)∑
u ∈U π (u, t)
, (31)
where π (k, t) is the influence of user k at the target item t , and can
be computed according to (8). Note that here we compute π (k, t)
for each user k at one time.
After obtaining the weight vectorH, we can compute the deriva-
tive of function defined in (30) in a similar way. Table 4 illustrates the
attack results on matrix-factorization-based recommender systems
when we weight normal users, where the experimental settings
are the same as those in Table 1. Here, “Weighting" means that
we weight each normal user and optimize the attack of (30) over
the weighted normal users, and the weight of each normal user
is computed based on (31). Comparing Tables 1 and 4, we can see
that the performance is improved when we consider the weights of
different normal users with respect to the target items. Our results
show that, when an attacker has enough computational resource,
the attacker can further improve attack effectiveness using influ-
ence function to weight normal users instead of dropping some of
them.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the first data poisoning attack to matrix-
factorization-based top-N recommender systems. Our key idea
is that, instead of optimizing the ratings of a fake user using all
normal users, we use a subset of influential users. Moreover, we
proposed an efficient influence function based method to determine
the influential user set for a specific target item. We also performed
extensive experimental studies to demonstrate the efficacy of our
proposed attacks. Our results showed that our proposed attacks
outperform existing ones.
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